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ESSAY REVIEW

EDITING HUTCHESON’S INQUIRY*

Christoph Fehige


Liberty Fund has brought us many blessings – among them many respectable and affordable editions of important works. One of its book series, the *Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics*, promises to be formidable in its own right. Under the general editorship of Knud Haakonssen, the series will comprise more than forty volumes, all of them modern editions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century works on jurisprudence, moral philosophy, political theory and theology. Seven of the volumes will form *The Collected Works and Correspondence of Francis Hutcheson*.

A recent addition is Hutcheson’s *Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, edited by Wolfgang Leidhold. The *Inquiry* was first published in 1725. It was, as the cover of this edition rightly states, a ‘seminal text of the Scottish Enlightenment’ and has become a classic in aesthetics and moral philosophy. Hutcheson pursues a line of thought in this work that he found in Shaftesbury: that there are more than five senses. For one thing, there is a sense of beauty – our ‘Power of receiving’ the pleasant idea of beauty (23). The ‘real Quality in the Objects’ that excites that idea

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(23) is ‘Uniformity amidst Variety’ (28, 79). The beauty of birds, for instance,

arises from the vast Variety of Feathers . . . which retain a vast Resemblance in their Structure among all the Species, and a perfect Uniformity in those of the same Species in the corresponding Parts, and in the two Sides of each Individual . . .

(34)

Such ‘Original’ or ‘Absolute’ beauty (27 f.) Hutcheson distinguishes from the ‘Comparative’ or ‘Relative’ beauty we find in ‘Imitations’ like pictures or statues (27, 42). Hutcheson’s account of beauty affects the teleological argument for the existence of God. If the world looked less beautiful to us than it does, its designedness would not be less likely: it could still have been designed by a being with a different sense of beauty. So it is not the beauty, but the regularity of the world that bears evidence to the intelligence of its cause. All this is explained in the treatise on ‘Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design’, the first part of the Inquiry.

There is also a moral sense, by which ‘we perceive Pleasure in the Contemplation’ of virtuous actions, and even more pleasure ‘in being conscious of having done such Actions our selves’ (88). The moral sense, its workings and pronouncements, are the topic of the second and more famous half of the Inquiry, the treatise on ‘Virtue or Moral Good’. The actions that the moral sense discovers to be virtuous appear to spring from benevolence, especially from universal benevolence aiming for ‘the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers’ (125, see also 126). Both the sense of beauty and the moral sense are part of our nature. Although they provide us with pleasant ideas when detecting beauty or virtue, that pleasure does not arise from views of our own advantage. Those of our actions motivated by the pleasant idea of virtue are thus not motivated by our view of our own advantage. Still, such actions are to our advantage. For ‘moral Pleasures . . . are the most delightful Ingredient in the ordinary Pleasures of Life’, whereas ‘a State of moral Evil’ is ‘worse and more wretched than any other whatsoever’ (162). Virtue is ‘the chief Happiness’ (166).

INTRODUCTION AND FURTHER READING

How does the new edition proceed? In his eight-page introduction, Professor Leidhold does a fine job outlining the doctrine of the Inquiry, including parallels between its aesthetic and its moral half. The introduction will be of use to those who know nothing about Hutcheson or this work, but even (or especially) that group might hope for more. There is no information on Hutcheson’s life. Nothing is said about his impact on other philosophers; David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith, for example, make no
appearance in this book. No philosophical tension in the thoughts of the Inquiry is mentioned, and no controversy about their interpretation. And although the edition prides itself on documenting the changes the text has undergone from 1725 to 1738 – significant changes indeed –, no attempt is made to indicate the philosophical thrust of these changes, let alone their roots in objections that Hutcheson’s contemporaries raised against the early editions. On the other hand, space was deemed in sufficient supply to have the introduction open and close with an emphasis on liberty – an emphasis that fails to correspond to any preponderance of that topic in the Inquiry itself. It appears that here the gratitude to Liberty Fund, Inc., for sponsoring the edition has been allowed to shape the message.

Readers who would like this edition to point them to works about Hutcheson or the Inquiry should look in two places. Some such works appear in the notes to the introduction, some in the list ‘References and Further Reading’ and some in both. While it is in the nature of things that quite a few appear nowhere, some omissions defeat explanation. The three that baffle me most are Mautner (1993), Turco (1999) and Lupoli (2000). Thomas Mautner (1993) has a lot to say, not just about Hutcheson’s work and intellectual environment in general, but about the Inquiry in particular; this includes information both about the editions and about early responses to the work, including reviews. Luigi Turco (1999) has further information on the editions and relates Hutcheson’s revisions to the objections that the early editions gave rise to. Agostino Lupoli’s Italian edition of the Inquiry features, over and above numerous explanatory notes, 95 pages of introductory material, including a 17-page bibliography. All these sources contain cart-loads of material on the Inquiry, some of it dealing with important issues that this edition does not even touch upon. The editor should at least point his readers to these treasure chests, just as he points them to his own German translation of half of the Inquiry.

THE EDITIONS

We now turn to the ‘Note on the Text’ (xxiii–xxv). Its first half attempts to give an account of the various versions of the Inquiry. The account sets in with one version of the first edition – a text that the editor calls A and that I will refer to as A2. The editor fails to mention the two versions of this edition with title pages different from that of A2, both of which Thomas Mautner has begun to describe. Let us call these texts A1 (the first on Mautner’s list, 1993: 169 f.) and A3 (third on the list, ibid.: 171). Intended to be ‘text critical’ (xxiii), the edition at hand should tell the reader that three versions of the first edition exist and what the differences between them are.

Wolfgang Leidhold proceeds to describe the second edition, with the title page giving 1726 as the year of publication, and calls it B. He does not
mention that this edition was already published in October 1725, a fact put
on the record both by Mautner (1993: 171) and Turco (1999: 80). He does
not mention that a separate booklet was published, called *Alterations and
Additions Made in the Second Edition of the Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue,*
also dated 1726 on the title page. This 30-page pamphlet, which I will call
B*, was probably supposed to enable owners of the first edition to catch up
with the changes at a moderate expense. The existence of B* is hardly a
secret, the less so as it was reprinted in vol. 1 of Hutcheson’s *Collected
Works* in 1971. It is also mentioned by Mautner (1993: 171) and recorded on
T. E. Jessop’s list (1938/1966: 144), which Leidhold correctly says is ‘still
valuable as a basic bibliography’ (x f.). One reason why B* deserves
attention is that the text we would obtain by combining A and B* is not
identical to B – more on this below. If there is an argument for keeping
variants from B* out of a text-critical edition, the argument should be made.
 Silence on the very existence of B* is no good.

Leidhold then identifies the third edition, of 1729, and calls it C. There are
puzzling differences between the account of the second and the third edition
that Leidhold gives here and the account that he gives, almost
simultaneously, in the *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*. In his
contribution on Hutcheson in the *Grundriss* (2004: 125), he writes that the
second edition, from 1726, was printed again in 1736, years after the third
edition; and that the third edition came out as early as 1727. Let us hope
that the reason why these claims do not appear in the Liberty-Fund edition
is that they are false.

With the fourth edition, things become a little more complex. We know of
three different items that lay claim to the title ‘Fourth Edition, Corrected’,
all dated 1738. Leidhold calls them D1, D2 and D3. He classifies the first,
D1, as a ‘reprint of the 1729 edition (C)’. The classification may be justified,
but should not blind us to the differences. The title pages are distinct. Line
breaks and capitalization change, as do dozens of page breaks, quite a few
of them by several lines. The pagination changes because the second treatise
now starts on p. 105 instead of p. 104. More importantly, there are textual
differences. Turco (1999: 85) points to a change in the preface, and Lupoli
(2000: 89) to a change in a quotation. Further examples of textual
differences can be found on the following pages of D1: 55, 67, 71, 160, 168,
205, 229, 237, 259, 262 and 298. While it may well be doubted that
Hutcheson had a hand in these changes, such a doubt does not excuse the
editor from mentioning their existence. The reader is led to believe that no
differences exist.

Next, Leidhold characterizes D2, which in his textual notes will go by
the name of D, without a numeral. Many scholars use this text because
Gregg International reprinted it in 1969. Things become unnecessarily
cryptic when Leidhold speaks of the final version of the fourth edition,
D3. That version, Leidhold reports, ends with ‘Directions to the
Bookbinder’ not printed in D2. The bookbinder is instructed to ‘cancel’
a number of pages, altogether at least 74. Leidhold quotes (somewhat inaccurately) the complete set of these directions and says that they are ‘obviously directions that had not been carried out properly in D2’. Is this to mean that none of these directions had been carried out properly in D2, or that some had been and some not? Why does the editor not check and tell us? Furthermore, readers unfamiliar with eighteenth-century printing-and-binding jargon would probably welcome the clarification that the extensive ‘cancelling’ of pages was really a substituting of pages, not a shortening of the work by almost a fourth. It is also unclear why Leidhold limits himself to disclosing that D2 and D3 ‘have identical title pages’ when the truth is that all three – D1 and D2 and D3 – have identical title pages. Since that makes it hard to distinguish the three items from each other in library catalogues, it would be desirable to read where copies can be found and which copies have been used for this edition. Things move from cryptic towards false when Leidhold writes that ‘[i]n D3, pages 179 and 180 are printed twice’. This wording suggests that the complete pages – text and page number – appear twice. They do not. The text is different, only the page numbers are used twice. Moreover, there is a straightforward explanation for this quirk. Leidhold leaves his reader groping in the dark.

Luigi Turco seems to have been the first to figure out what must have happened with the fourth edition, and kindly clarified the matter for me. The bookbinder had D1 in front of him and received: the directions to cancel pages, the cancellantia (replacement pages) for those cancellanda and pages with ‘Additions and Corrections’ to be appended to the end of the work. This cancelling, replacing and appending the bookbinder was supposed to perform on D1. He performed all tasks but one: the cancelling and replacing of pages 173 to 179.1 The result is D2. Why did he omit precisely one change? Perhaps because he shrank from the consequences: either (should he fail to include the old leaf 179/180 in the new product) an incorrect catchword and a breakdown of syntax and meaning at the transition from the new page 180 to the old page 181 – or (should he include the old leaf 179/180 after the new leaf with the same numbers) the double use of page numbers 179 and 180. D3 differs from D2 precisely in that the one remaining change, too, is finally performed, and that some heedful soul, hoping that this would insure proper cancelling, replacing and binding this time round, arranged for the directions themselves to be printed on the last page (the back of the final page of the ‘Additions and Corrections’). As a precaution against the oversight of cancels, the printing and including of such directions in the

1The ‘Directions to the Bookbinder’ have their specifications of the ranges of cancellations end with odd page numbers. I follow this convention here. Barring the option of pasting one leaf on top of another, the cancelling itself would have either to stop short of the odd-numbered page or to extend to the even-numbered page that follows (and is the verso of the same leaf).
books themselves was not uncommon (see Chapman 1930: 26 f.). The page numbers 179 and 180 are used twice because Hutcheson wanted to add almost two pages of text earlier in the same group of cancellantia: there is the new article 3.VI on pages 177 f. (of D3), in which he distinguishes three kinds of benevolence (see also Lupoli 2000: 89). Using some page numbers twice is one way out if you insist on squeezing extra amounts of text into a book without changing the pagination of the subsequent pages. Much of this story is confirmed by the numbering of articles on pages 177 to 186 of D2. As updated by the ‘Alterations and Corrections’ printed at the end of D2, the numbering looks faulty in that it lacks an article VII. But this is only because in D2 pages 173 to 179 have not been cancelled and replaced as required and as the ‘Alterations and Corrections’ assumed they would be. If the ‘Alterations and Corrections’ are applied with the cancellantia in place, the numbering of the articles works.

So much for the fourth edition. It would have been helpful of Leidhold to mention and characterize the fifth, posthumous edition as well, and to ask what justification it has, or fails to have, to call itself a ‘Corrected’ edition. The fact that Hutcheson wrote and published an extensive preview of the Inquiry would also deserve mention at some place or other. The preview was printed in the London Journal in 1724 (the year given in Leidhold 2004: 125 is incorrect); a modern edition with annotations can be found in the volume On Human Nature, edited by Thomas Mautner in 1993.

EDITORIAL DECISIONS

The second part of the ‘Note on the Text’ explains the editorial decisions. There are limits to what this edition seeks to capture. There is no ambition to faithfully render italics and small capitals even for B, the copy-text of this edition; and no ambition to document, in the ‘Textual Notes’, variations in punctuation and spelling. While some of us will miss some of these features, especially the italics, it is a legitimate option, and increases readability, to draw the line where this edition has drawn it.

The main editorial decision is reported outside the section ‘Editorial Decisions’, on p. xxiii: the decision to base the edition on text B, ‘since this is the first corrected text’. Seven words make for an unusually brief statement of the reason for the choice of a copy-text, and in this case for a misleading statement to boot. It is not as if in B we had the text in almost its original form, although with some corrections. B is a substantially revised text, with large chunks of new philosophical prose. Other substantial revisions followed in the third and fourth editions. Readers should be told why they are made to concentrate on one philosophical stopover (1726) rather than on a later one (1729) or on the philosophical starting-point (1725) or the philosophical endpoint (1738) of the journey.
The main text is pleasant to read and has Hutcheson’s own footnotes and the editor’s explanations, not the textual variants, at the bottom of the pages. Editorial explanations include translations of most of the Greek and Latin quotations as well as glosses on events, people and places to which Hutcheson refers. While the explanations that are there leave little to be desired, the reader keeps wondering why some explanations are there and others not.

- Explanations come forth when Hutcheson mentions ‘the greatest part of our latter Moralists’ (86) or ‘our late Debates about Passive Obedience’ (118). But no explanation comes forth when Hutcheson mentions ‘the Treatises of our late Improvers of mechanical Philosophy’ (45) or a group of thinkers ‘who after Mr. Locke have shaken off the groundless Opinions about innate Ideas’ and now hold certain views about beauty (66).

- When Hutcheson quotes from *The Fable of the Bees* (e.g. 97, 113), the editor maps the old page numbers on those of Kaye’s modern edition. But no such mapping is attempted when Hutcheson quotes, also by page numbers, from the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence (39) or from Shaftesbury (139, 141).

- On the same page (39) on which explanatory notes introduce us to Descartes, Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, Pufendorf remains unexplained. The silence would not astonish if Pufendorf had been introduced in an earlier note, but he has not. He has to wait until page 94.

- Hutcheson illustrates the scope of our benevolence by conjecturing that, ‘had we any Notions of rational Agents . . . in the most distant Planets, our good Wishes would still attend them’. This remark triggers nine lines of explanations about seventeenth- and eighteenth-century literature on space travel (114 f.). Hutcheson’s mention of the ‘Moratae Fabulae, or the Ἡθη of Aristotle’ (43) triggers no explanation.

- When Hutcheson mentions Descartes and the pronouncement ‘Cogito, ergo sum’ (39), the editor adds where in the work of ‘René Descartes (1596–1650), French philosopher and mathematician’, this principle can be found. In the very same sentence, we find Hutcheson deride those who believe ‘Impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse’ to be a ‘Principium humanae Cognitionis absoluté primum’. Since the Impossibile-dictum is less famous than ‘Cogito, ergo sum’ and Hutcheson himself does not connect it with a name, an explanation is more urgent here than it was there, but also a shade harder. The explanation that very few readers needed was given, whereas the explanation that many readers need is not.
Is a principle at work in any of these matters? These are not the only manifestations of insouciance. For instance, the editor points us to Shaftesbury’s *Inquiry Concerning Virtue*, part 2, section 1’ (87). Of book 1 or of book 2? Next, one of Hutcheson’s own notes is rendered as: ‘See the Preface, Page 7’ (90). Whence the number 7? Hutcheson writes ‘Page 6’, which does not correspond to page 7 in this edition. Hutcheson does indeed mean the sixth page of the preface (it used to be p. vi in text A2 and, because of the dedication preceding it, has become p. xiv in text B), which corresponds to pages 8 f. of this edition; that is where we find the definition Hutcheson speaks of. Textual note 7 on page 199 should begin ‘D [Corrigenda, p. 309]’. Why does an editorial explanation on page 201 tell us so much about some lines from Cicero, but withhold the information that Cicero himself only quotes them from Ennius’s *Annales*? The editor’s references to specific passages in Aristotle use the standard pagination sometimes (e.g. 207), but not always (209).

One class of editorial errors concerns a project that was so dear to Hutcheson’s heart that he announced it on the title pages of A1 and A2: his ‘Attempt to introduce a Mathematical Calculation in Subjects of Morality’. At the core of this mathematization, Hutcheson employs, among other symbols, both the numeral ‘1’ and the capital letter ‘I’, with the letter signifying ‘private Good, or Interest’ (128). He succeeded in making his original printer distinguish the numeral from the letter, but the new edition fails him and misrenders ‘1’ as ‘I’. This error makes four of Hutcheson’s axioms unintelligible (128, 130, 235). Furthermore, Hutcheson corrects one axiom (‘Errata’ in B, p. xxvi, original pagination). The new edition sets about to document this correction (236, n. 73), but only ends up printing the error a second time.

The index is markedly superior to that of the companion volume in the same series, Aaron Garrett’s edition of Hutcheson’s *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections: With Illustrations on the Moral Sense*. That edition has, along with numerous merits, the following peculiarity. ‘Horace’, Garrett writes on p. 1, ‘is the most quoted of the classical authors in the *Essay with Illustrations*, although Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Plato, and Aristotle are also frequently cited’. One would think that the five most frequently cited classical authors are entitled to a place in the index. But only Marcus Aurelius makes it. The others, and altogether far more than a dozen major players, do not.

Any problems with Leidhold’s index pale in comparison. Much of it looks very reasonable. A cursory check reveals that some names are missing: Achilles, Caesar, Cudworth, Hecuba, Priam, Pyrrhos, Sinon, Zeno of Citium and others; that some page numbers are wrong (in the entries for Cumberland, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Virgil); and that some page numbers are missing (in the entries for Berkeley, Cicero, Cumberland, Hobbes, Horace, Locke, Newton, Pufendorf and others). The two mentions of philosophers that are most salient, and that are most
frequently referred to in works about the Inquiry, are not indexed either. They appear in the textual notes, on page 199, where the text of the original title page is given. In the Inquiry, the original title page says, ‘the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are Explain’d and Defended, against the Author of the Fable of the Bees’. 

TEXTUAL NOTES

We now have to look at the variants. They are the essence and point of a text-critical edition and in this case extend over 49 pages. Laudably and unlike some editors, Leidhold does not presume to select the important textual differences for us, but aims for completeness: ‘The textual notes state the differences between the text of B and the other editions, except for variations in spelling and punctuation’ (xxv). While no doubt many of the textual notes are in good shape, many of them are not. I will concentrate on the larger problems that have come to my attention.

One problem is this. If a variant from C survives in D2, the textual note will mention this fact – but if the variant survives from D2 to D3, the textual note will not mention this fact. Nowhere is this asymmetry in notation announced. The official explanation on page xxv and the large number of textual notes modelled on it suggest that, just like other versions of the work, D3 will be mentioned whenever it retains a variant. But it is not, and so the reader is made to acquire numerous false beliefs about it. Her risk of staying on the wrong track is increased by the fact that the asymmetry that is not explained in the first place is not carried through consistently. The existence of one textual note (233 n. 47) telling the reader explicitly that a change is in D2 and in D3 is bound to consolidate the false belief that, wherever D2 is mentioned but D3 is not, the wording at issue is only in D2. All this is the more problematic as D3 is not any old interim version, but the last version of the text in Hutcheson’s lifetime. The reader’s chances of identifying the final wording are slim.

Similar problems arise for notes registering the corrections listed under ‘Errata’ in the second edition, B. I will confine myself to one example from a

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2 Does the convention of saying ‘D’ function as a clue? No, because the explanations on pp. xxiv f. state unequivocally that ‘D’ stands for D2, not for what D2 and D3 have in common. Does the fact that D2 and D3 are versions of the same edition function as a clue? No, because there is no way for the reader to suspect that differences between versions of the same edition are documented in another notation than differences between editions. One reason why she cannot suspect this is that, for all she knows (see p. xxiv), D2 and D3 might differ from each other substantially. Secondly, see p. xxv: the general explanations about the textual notes, although they begin by talking of ‘editions’, are then stated to apply to A, B, C, D and D3. – The problem is less dramatic for the notes reporting changes in the ‘Additions and Corrections’ of D2, because the vigilant reader will remember having been told, on p. xxiv, that the ‘Additions and Corrections’ are the same in D3 as in D2.
whole group of cases. Textual note 6 on p. 208 says: ‘B [Errata]: whom’.
There are two ways to read this. Either the note claims that the change is in
that list of errata and in all subsequent editions. This reading makes the note
false. Or the note claims that the change is in that list of errata only. But this
kind of reading makes textual note 10, from the same page, false. There is
another kind of note about the errata that goes like this: ‘Deleted in B
[Errata], D (p. 6)’ (202 n. 17). This allows for one interpretation only,
entailing that the change is not in C. But it is.

The situation is aggravated by those problems that the textual notes
inherit from the editor’s account of the editions and issues, reviewed above.
One change in the Inquiry that has attracted attention among Hutcheson
scholars is that, at some point, the title page stops mentioning Hutcheson’s
moral calculus as well as Shaftesbury and Mandeville. Since the editor
ignores A3 (see above), the textual notes leave the reader with the
impression that this change happens in B. It happens in A3. Since the
editor ignores B* (see above), we lose out on all the variants of that text, too.
There is, for example, a new passage of 67 words in B (193, original
pagination) that is not to be found in B*. And at one point B speaks of ‘all
the Good produc’d by those actions’ where B* speaks of ‘all the good Effects’
the agent ‘proposes to attain by the Action’ (B 178, original pagination, vs.
B* 13, my italics). This difference relates to a major theme of the Inquiry: the
difference in moral status between foreseeable, foreseen or intended
consequences on the one hand and actual consequences on the other.

Next, probably because the editor takes D1 to be textually identical to C
(see above), the textual notes give the wrong picture of D1. There are more
than a dozen textual changes listed for D2 that already happen in D1: 210 n.
37; 211 n. 71; 212 n. 7; 228 n. 75; 230 n. 6; etc. Contrary to the editor’s
intentions as expressed on pp. xxiv f., some of the corrigenda listed at the
end of D2 do not find their way into the textual notes. This holds true of the
corrigenda for p. xiv of the preface and for pp. 183 f. Some of this is
paternalism gone wrong. The editor tries to help out Hutcheson by simply
suppressing two corrections that concern the numbering of articles in D2
and by claiming on p. 232 of his edition that in D2 article VII of section 3
was ‘wrongly’ renumbered VIII. But suppressing is never a good idea, and
certainly not in the case at hand: all three changes are correct, and turn out
to be so in D3. As was explained above, the only error in D2 was the
bookbinder’s failure to cancel and replace some pages. It is the Liberty-
Fund edition that muddles the numbering of the articles.

Four notes claim erroneously that certain changes happen in D3 that can
already be found, not just in D2 and D1, but even in C: 217 n. 26; 233 nn. 45
f.; 237 n. 89. There are more than forty notes claiming that changes first
happen in D2 that already happened nine years earlier, in C. See 201 n. 4;
202 n. 11; 204 nn. 10 f., 19, 21, 24 f.; 211 nn. 64, 67, 70; and dozens of others.

This is philological mayhem. We might wonder at this point whether the
editor has simply discovered and used peculiar mutations of C or D1. There
are four problems with this explanation. For one thing, it is not very likely. Secondly and thirdly, it would only cover a certain portion of the anomalies and that only at the cost of an additional failure – the failure of documenting the known versions along with the new finds. Fourthly, my attempts to give this explanation a chance were thwarted. I asked the editor several times which copies of the Inquiry, from which libraries, he had used. He would not say.

CONCLUSION

‘The reading experience itself’, says the Liberty-Fund catalogue about the books on offer, ‘is further enhanced by Liberty Fund’s devotion to rigorous standards of scholarship’. Not in the case at hand. To be sure, the structure and many ingredients of a sound edition are there. However, for a twenty-first-century edition of a philosophical classic, aspiring to document textual variants and published in a respectable series, the number of glitches is far too large. Even if we waive the problems with the introduction, bibliography, account of editions and issues, explanatory notes and index, we are left with the fact that the ‘text critical apparatus’ (xxiii) has massive flaws. I would not run the risk of quoting from this edition without first checking either the eighteenth-century originals or their facsimiles, electronic or printed. The publisher, the series editor and the editor might consider giving us a revised edition, or a long list of errata, soon.

REFERENCES


3This review is based on the following copies: Kessinger facsimile reprint of C, Gregg International facsimile reprint of D2, University of Sydney Library copies of D1 and D3. For each of these four items I proceeded as follows: when I noticed that the copy failed to say what according to the Liberty-Fund edition it should say, a random subset of the discrepancies was checked (by colleagues, librarians or myself) in various other copies. In no case was the new edition vindicated.


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